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ABSTRACT
Populism appeals to the masses, and against elites. To the extent that any successful democracy must 
respond to popular desires, democracies must incorporate some elements of populism. Nevertheless, for 
continued success a democratic polity also must ensure widespread education, including a concern for 
language and the ability to analyze and resist “mind manipulators”.
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DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINITION
“Populism” has different meanings, making it not only difficult to define, but 
perhaps even impossible to do so elegantly. As Margaret Canovan notes, “the reader 
who opens a book entitled ‘Populism’ can have very little idea what to expect. Al-
though frequently used by historians, social scientists, and political commentators, 
the term is exceptionally vague and refers in different contexts to a bewildering 
variety of phenomena” [Canovan 1981: 3].
She gives examples, including various techniques of direct democracy (e.g. 
referendum and initiative), characteristics of certain dictatorships (e.g., Perón’s 
in Argentina), various peasant movements, outbursts of reactionary outrage (e.g., 
“white backlash”, in the USA), etc. She might have added recent “tax revolts”, in 
the US, so forceful that one of its major political parties asserts that taxes can only 
be decreased, never increased – even going into war. 
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Adding perhaps even more complexity are strange developments that Hannah 
Arendt has noted in On Revolution. Although she does not cite them as populist, they 
would seem to be related. She identified “those councils, soviets, and Räte which 
were to make their appearance in every genuine revolution throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Each time they appeared”, she said, “they sprang up as the 
spontaneous organs of the people, not only outside of all revolutionary parties but 
entirely unexpected by them, and their leaders” [Arendt 1965: 252].
Canovan concedes explicitly the futility of seeking a simple understanding: “One 
thing which the existing literature makes clear”, she writes, “is that we cannot hope 
to reduce all cases of populism to a single definition or find a single essence behind 
all established uses of the term” [Canovan 1981:7]. She even expressed reservations 
about using the word at all, saying that because of its ambiguities, no social scientist 
would deliberately invent it if it did not already exist, but “the term does exist: there 
it is, firmly ensconced in a number of languages, constantly used by scholars and 
journalists alike. We cannot get rid of it” [Canovan 1981: 301]. 
Among the huge number of writings on populism, there is a quite brief, but 
varied and “reasonably representative selection alphabetized by author and ranging 
roughly over more than three quarters of a century” [Skidmore 2006: 339–346]. 
A somewhat updated yet still very brief version might include (in addition to Canovan 
herself, omitted here): Peter Argersinger, The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism: West-
ern Populism and American Politics (1995); Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane 
Preference in America (1991); John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (1931); Richard 
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (1955); Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion in 
American History (1995); Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (2007), and C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, (1951).
SIMPLIFYING POPULISM: DISTILLING IT DOWN TO A WORKABLE DEFINITION
Canovan explains that she wrote her book to demonstrate that the term does have 
some utility. It “need not be hopelessly confusing”, and can help identify political phe-
nomena “that are in need of study” if we are sufficiently careful in using it, and if we 
invest the energy required to sift through its numerous components [Canovan 1981: 301].
However, promising such a systematic approach may be, it does not exhaust the 
possibilities; there are other modes of study that may be quite useful. Rather than 
dissecting the term, as Canovan does – in pursuit of “the process of clarification re-
quired to turn one of the most confusing words in the vocabulary of political science 
into a precise and readily applicable concept” – there may also be value in taking 
a more relaxed and less formal approach. Despite the incompatibility of many of the 
usages of “populism”, at the most fundamental level the usages clearly do share some 
common elements. These may be sufficient to develop an informal understanding 
that will be useful, however, lacking it may be in philosophical sophistication. 
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Thus, we adopt a loose working definition, and deliberately avoid any attempt 
at precision. We also avoid the value judgments many writers express who assume 
that “populism” necessarily denotes crypto-fascism or right-wing mass phenomena 
in general. This article shares Canovan’s disquiet with the term, while also being 
resigned to its use. From there on, however, it digresses from her position not in disa-
greement, but to pursue a different direction. The goal here is simply a workable usage 
that discards formality and seeks to develop insights from common understandings.
POPULISM, DEMOCRACY, AND RELIGION
For our purposes, “populism” is value neutral. It must be a component to some 
degree of democratic polities, but it is not “democracy”. Democracy presupposes 
some element of populism, but democracies can differ from one another. One way 
in which they may differ is the degree or extent of populism that they involve. The 
elements of liberalism and constitutionalism that form components of most modern 
democracies, are not components of populism, which tends to elevate majoritarianism 
above other elements.
Although populism and democracy are not synonymous, they are simultaneous. 
They present advantages and disadvantages that are similar, and they require similar 
conditions to function optimally.
“Populism” as used here refers to policies and rhetoric appealing to “the people”, 
rather than to an elite. It does not presuppose a position on the left-right political spec-
trum. Although its essence is majoritarian, rather than individualistic, populist appeals 
can be presented in individualistic terms. Frequently, populism directs opposition 
toward a specific group as scapegoats, real or imagined, and against intellectuals as 
contrasted with “common people” – although scapegoating is not a prerequisite. In 
any case, as Richard Hofstadter asserted, it often does contain strong anti-intellec-
tual elements [Hofstadter 1963; Hofstadter 1964]. At their extreme, these become 
overtly anti-science. 
Populism often includes explicitly religious elements, generally fundamentalist 
or literalist. Note here that “fundamentalism”, is a mindset, not limited to religion; 
it and its companion “literalism” may be found across the spectrum of thought and 
human endeavor – consider, for example, constitutional interpretation, economic 
dogma, and social matters. Wherever it exists its rigidity creates dangers, as Crapan-
zano demonstrates so brilliantly [Crapanzano 2000].
THE IMPORTANCE OF POPULISM, AND ITS DANGERS
Democratic governments, those based on popular consent, by definition must to 
some degree be populist; that is, as they formulate public policy they must employ 
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measures to consult the people. Taking public opinion into consideration requires at 
least to some extent, appeals to the people. 
By listening to public opinion and whenever possible shaping public policies to 
reflect public desires, such polities have the potential to improve conditions for the 
public. To improve conditions, though, there must be more than sensitivity to public 
opinion. Responding to public opinion that is ill-founded, misinformed, misguided, 
and in error can damage, rather than benefit, the public. Thus, it is important to 
establish the conditions most conducive to ensuring that the public is accurately 
informed; that is, that the public possesses a high degree of accurate information, 
and that the level of misinformation must be held to a minimum.
By definition, the greater the populist appeal (assuming that it is effective), the 
more numerous the group receiving, and acting upon, the message. Under nearly all 
existing circumstances, the greater the number of people receiving the message, the 
greater will be the number of those who have minimal education, or who are likely 
for many reasons to be unable to receive it thoughtfully. The broader the audience, 
the more likely it will be that it will contain those who are especially susceptible to 
demagogic manipulation. Note that this assumption does not question the democratic 
principle that the people possess, collectively, a wisdom that is the motivating prin-
ciple of democratic theory. It merely reflects awareness that nothing is perfect, or 
functions perfectly; that proper conditions are essential for that wisdom to prevail, 
and for the people to function at their full potential.
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE: ITS USE AND ABUSE
An informed public is essential, but information is insufficient. To operate ra-
tionally, populations must be informed, but must also possess the skills to evaluate 
effectively the information that they have. As both popular literature and scholarly 
studies demonstrate, rational appeals do not always produce rational results. For ex-
ample, George Lakoff argues that the “framing” of issues – their shaping, description, 
and presentation – affects an audience more powerfully than does its logic [Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003; Lakoff 2004; Lakoff 2009]. Drew Westin suggests similarly that 
rational presentations have far less success than emotional ones [Westin 2007]. 
A perfect example comes from Robert Caro’s massive work on Lyndon B. John-
son. Caro is no LBJ partisan, and has been accused of “demonizing” Johnson [Woods 
2008]. From the third volume forward, though, his treatment is nuanced and thought-
ful, and presents some of the most insightful work on LBJ ever written. 
Volume Four deals with LBJ’s vice presidency and his early months as president. 
Here, Caro describes a brief speech that Vice President Johnson gave at Gettysburg 
Battlefield on Memorial Day weekend in 1963, a century after Lincoln’s immortal 
Address there. LBJ had accepted the invitation to speak on his own initiative, sought 
no approval, and spoke only his own words. The Kennedy administration had shut 
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him out entirely from policy formation. The “Washington Post” ran his Gettysburg 
speech as the lead story on page one. Caro said the speech had been so short, “bare-
ly two typed pages”, that Johnson had read it in eight minutes. “Lincoln’s speech 
had been short, too”, Caro said, and, the “Post” said in an editorial, this one, too, 
had “eloquence (…), political courage (…), vision”. LBJ had said, “One hundred 
years ago, the slave was freed (…). One hundred years later, the Negro remains in 
bondage to the color of his skin. The Negro today asks justice. We do not answer 
him – we do not answer those who lie beneath this soil – when we reply to the Negro 
by asking, ‘Patience’. (…) To ask for patience from the Negro is to ask him to give 
more of what he has already given enough (…). The Negro says, ‘Now.’ Others say, 
‘Never.’ The voice of responsible Americans – the voice of those who died here and 
the great man who spoke here – their voices say, ‘Together’. There is no other way” 
[Caro 2012: 256].
Caro described the persistence and patience with which Johnson had sought an 
audience alone with President Kennedy on civil rights. “May of 1963 had been the 
month of Birmingham”. LBJ had said, “They’ve turned the fire hoses on a little black 
girl (…) They’re rolling that little girl right down the middle of the street”, the month 
of the fierce dogs “that Bull Connor’s police kept on leashes, but not tightly. And all 
that month, the President and the attorney general and their aides were discussing 
what to do in Birmingham, and whether or not to propose new civil rights legislation, 
and what that legislation should be, but they hadn’t been discussing it with him”. 
He kept repeating his request for a meeting with Kennedy, and met rebuff after re-
buff. Finally, “at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, June 3, Johnson was allowed into the Oval 
Office”. He was not to meet alone with JFK, but also with aides Ken O’Donnell, 
Ted Sorensen, and the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy (RFK 
hated LBJ – the hatred was mutual – and undercut him constantly). “Since, at last, 
the President had asked Lyndon Johnson for advice about civil rights, he gave some”. 
He did not know what was in the administration’s bill, and knew of it only by reading 
about it in the “New York Times”, he said, nor had he sat in on any meetings, but 
then the master legislative strategist gave detailed advice on how to proceed – and 
how not to do so. His advice on strategy went unheeded.
Beyond that, this political genius LBJ who had been purely pragmatic, “who had 
despised politicians who talked about »principled things«”, began talking about a moral 
commitment. “»Negroes are tired of this patient stuff and tired of this piecemeal stuff 
and what they want more than anything else is not an executive order or legislation, 
they want a moral commitment that he’s behind them.«” Kennedy hadn’t given them 
that commitment, he said. Legislation – no matter how well written it was – was only 
part of the answer to the civil rights problem, he said. “The Negroes feel and they’re 
suspicious that we’re just doing what we got to do [to keep their vote] (…). What 
Negroes are really seeking is moral force and to be sure that we’re on their side (…) 
and until they receive that assurance, unless it’s stated dramatically and convincingly, 
they’re not going to pay much attention to executive orders and legislative recommen-
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dations’ (…).” And only the President himself can give them that assurance. President 
Kennedy then directed that LBJ and O’Donnell meet to discuss the issue in more detail. 
They did so, and O’Donnell reported back to the president.
“The next morning Johnson met with Kennedy again. And that afternoon was 
the first of a series of meetings that had been scheduled with leaders of various 
groups – this one was with a hundred executives of America’s largest retail chains 
– to mobilize opinion behind the civil rights effort. Kennedy had invited him at the 
last minute. And when he spoke, some members of the Kennedy Administration who 
had never seen Lyndon Johnson ‘revved up’ saw it now.” The Kennedy people had 
notoriously derided LBJ as “Uncle Cornpone” or “Rufus Cornpone”, to the delight 
of fellow sophisticates at their Georgetown cocktail parties and elsewhere – often 
within the vice president’s hearing. They now had to take notice.
Presidential adviser – and intellectual force – Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was present. 
“Schlesinger felt almost as if he were watching ‘a Southern preacher’. Kennedy was 
‘wholly reasonable, appealing to the intellect. Johnson was evangelical. He was elo-
quent, all-out emotionally’. Whatever doubts Schlesinger had entertained about his 
sincerity on the issue evaporated that afternoon. He realized now, he was to say, that 
Johnson was a ‘true believer’. And anyone who observed the courtesy with which 
the President treated him at these meetings might have imagined for a moment that 
Lyndon Johnson was being given, at last, a significant role in the administration”. 
Kennedy “began to invoke him as an authority”. LBJ advised Kennedy to “make the 
point that while he could order Negroes into a foxhole in a foreign country to fight 
for the American flag, he couldn’t get them into southern restaurants while they were 
on their way to join their units to go to the war. They couldn’t get a cup of coffee 
while they were on their way to die for the flag, he said, and with his huge hand he 
grabbed the flagpole of the American flag that stood beside his desk, and shook it in 
his rage at the injustice” [Caro 2012: 257–262]. Like Lincoln, LBJ knew, and used, 
the power of language.
Rarely does language receive the attention it deserves, despite the quip that the 
pen is mightier than the sword. When it is “weaponized”, it takes on specific char-
acteristics, and if it goes to the dark side becomes propaganda.
PROPAGANDA
Studies of public opinion go back at least to the early 1920s, when a prominent 
journalist, Walter Lippmann, brought out his pioneering Public Opinion, a study of 
social psychology, media, and the ways in which attitudes develop [Lippmann 1922]. 
Shortly thereafter, another journalist, Edward Bernays, an Austrian immigrant, wrote 
his controversial work, Propaganda [Bernays 1928]. 
Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, called for the “engineering of consent”, 
the deliberate manipulation of public opinion on behalf of both government and 
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corporate interests using scientifically valid psychological techniques. He saw prop-
aganda as a social good (though he used it to benefit commercial interests, including 
the American Tobacco Company). One should note that the term “propaganda” at the 
time had little of the negative connotation that emerged so forcefully in the 1930s, 
when Stalin’s Soviet Union, and various Fascist dictatorships – especially Germany 
under Hitler’s misnamed “National Socialism” – used scientific techniques to warp 
language and shape public opinion. Manipulation, distortion, and abuse of language 
led to violence and terror.
The roots, though, reach further back than formal studies. Both Lippmann and 
Bernays had been key officials during World War One of President Woodrow Wilson’s 
“Committee on Public Information”, headed by George Creel; the notorious “Creel 
Committee”. The blurb on the 2005 edition credits Bernays with “eerily prescient 
vision for regimenting the collective mind”, and suggests that his Propaganda is 
“an essential read for all who wish to understand how power is used by the ruling 
elite of our society”. 
Propaganda has advanced by orders of magnitude since Bernays, but he set 
the tone for much advertising in the 1930s and subsequently. Wendy Wall has ana-
lyzed brilliantly the use of propaganda techniques directed toward “Inventing the 
»American Way«” [Wall 2008]. The Advertising Council, the National Association 
of Manufacturers, and corporate interests in general were concerned with friction 
between management and labor, and sought national unity during World War II and 
thereafter. They portrayed a “tripod of freedom”, that did incorporate such praise-
worthy goals as civil liberties, representative democracy, religious freedom, and 
opposition to racism while concentrating on political goals such as anticommunism 
and, above all, “economic freedom”. 
To do so they drank deeply from the well of American popular culture and in 
the 1940s and 1950s conscripted even Superman, who became their spokesman for 
“Truth, Justice, and the American Way”, as they attempted to roll back the reforms 
of the New Deal. This campaign by the business community did not achieve all its 
goals, but on some levels it was so successful that many Americans and some of 
their more noisy political leaders now seem to think of the term “free enterprise” 
as having been a prime factor in the American Revolution, perhaps a key principle 
of the Constitution, and possibly even having been conferred upon the nation by 
Christianity itself (or, among the more ecumenical, by the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion). Wall, though, demonstrates that the term hardly existed before 1935 when 
“America’s corporate leaders” adopted a specific political strategy [Wall 2008: 
48–49]. 
After World War II, and Nazi Germany’s downfall, the noted literary and cultural 
critic George Steiner, wrote of the corruption of the German language. The Nazis, 
gleefully manufactured unparalleled linguistic ugliness and imposed it for their own 
sadistic purposes. They created mass barbarism and delusion among intelligent, and 
even educated, people – actually controlling a population.
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Steiner argued that languages can demonstrate that they have within themselves 
the germs of their own dissolution. “Actions of the mind that were once spontaneous 
become mechanical, frozen habits (dead metaphors, stock similes, slogans). Words 
grow longer and more ambiguous. Instead of style, there is rhetoric. Instead of 
precise common usage, there is jargon” [Steiner 1972: 27–28]. To be sure, Steiner 
admits, a Hitler would have found “venom and moral illiteracy” in any language, but 
German was “ready to give hell a native tongue”. He asked how could a word such 
as spritzen “recover a sane meaning after having signified to millions the spurting 
of Jewish blood from knife points?” [Steiner 1972: 29]. Words, he said, gradually 
lost their meanings “and acquired nightmarish definitions. Jude, Pole, Russe came 
to mean two-legged lice, putrid vermin which good Aryans must squash, as a party 
manual said, ‘like roaches on a dirty wall’. ‘Final solution’, endgültige Lösung, 
came to signify the death of six million human beings in gas ovens”. Beyond the 
bestialities, the language was called upon “to enforce numerous falsehoods”, to say 
“light” when there was darkness, “victory”, when there was defeat” [Steiner 1972: 
30]. This happened to a language, even though it is language “that has been the vessel 
of human grace and the prime carrier of civilization” [Steiner 1972: 38]. Fortunately, 
the German language demonstrated resilience, and did recover. 
German was not unique, except possibly in the extremes to which it went. George 
Orwell has pointed to similar, if less dramatic, tendencies in English [Orwell 1946], 
and modern political discourse in America and elsewhere is hardly reassuring. 
There were efforts to counter the assaults upon language. The most prominent of 
these was the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. The New York Public Library has 
the Institute’s records, two linear feet (two boxes), in the Manuscripts and Archives 
Division [Institute]. The Library indicates that a group of social science scholars 
founded the Institute in New York City in 1937, in order to enable the public to 
“detect and analyze propaganda”. The IPA conducted research into the methods 
developed to influence public opinion, it published analyses of current problems, 
and it promoted the establishment of study groups in public schools for detecting 
propaganda. It published a monthly bulletin, Propaganda Analysis from 1937 to 
1941. Additionally, the Institute produced a number of books, the most prominent 
of which was The Fine Art of Propaganda, by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth 
Briant Lee [Lee and Lee 1939], which analyzed radio speeches of the populist and 
anti-Semitic demagogue, Father Charles Coughlin. There also were Propaganda 
Analysis, the Group Leader’s Guide to Propaganda Analysis, and Propaganda: How 
to Recognize It and Deal with It. 
The New York Public Library’s IPA website mentions these, and the IPA’s “seven 
common propaganda devices”, “The ABCs of Propaganda Analysis”. These formed 
the basis for flyers and other materials supplied to schools, colleges, and “adult civic 
groups”. Americans of a certain age are likely to remember classroom materials from 
their school days that built around these seven techniques from IPA’s publication, 
Propaganda Analysis: 
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Name Calling – the propagandist uses false, or misleading, labels to create an 
unfavorable opinion of an opponent. Examples would be “he’s a Fascist,” or, “he’s 
unpatriotic”. In the United States, propagandists have used “un-American”, or (in the 
case of someone who will not agree to outlawing abortion), he or she is a “babykiller”.
Glittering Generalities – the propagandist uses them to create a favorable re-
action to whatever is desired. A notable recent example is “family values”.
Transfer – this device uses the authority and prestige of something hearers respect 
or revere to associate it with something he or she is trying to get hearers to accept.
Testimonial – originally, this meant the obvious: associating something the 
propagandist wants accepted with a figure whom the hearer respects. Now, it often 
includes entertainers, sports figures, or other celebrities often without regard to 
expertise.
Plain Folks – the use of an obviously populist technique to assert humble back-
ground, implying that it is superior to one of privilege. 
Card Stacking – in this technique, half-truth masquerades as truth. A mediocre 
candidate becomes an “intellectual titan”. Extremist elements become “freedom 
fighters”. 
Bandwagon – this technique “employs symbols, colors, music, movement, and 
all the dramatic arts” to convince the populace that “everyone agrees” that thus and 
so should be done, and that anyone who disagrees is out of step.
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis had a few quite active years, but “was 
dormant during World War II and in 1950 all operations ceased” [Institute].
Upon reflection, it would seem inevitable that the IPA would be controversial. 
Critics argued that it was too negative, that its efforts were simplistic, or that ana-
lyzing advertising would damage capitalism or the economy. An obvious objection 
would be that the habit of examining news for enemy propaganda would include 
building a resistance to America’s own wartime propaganda and thus undermine 
national solidarity. According to the New York Public Library’s materials, though, 
the IPA “maintains the reason it suspended its operations in 1942 was due to lack of 
sufficient funds and not the war”.
Undoubtedly, the techniques the IPA identified remain with us today, all over 
the world, throughout all political parties, and from candidates on all points along 
the political spectrum. They have been revised and expanded.
THE THREAT FROM FUNDAMENTALISM AND LITERALISM
There is yet another force that may be potentially even more important than prop-
aganda techniques. It certainly is related to language, but is a force that works overtly 
against language itself, and even the foundation of much of rational thought, logic.
Earlier, this article criticized fundamentalism, defined as literalism. Especially 
in the United States, there is a strong movement that emerged from fundamentalist 
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religion, but which has strongly influenced politics, economics, and other realms of 
human endeavor. It appears to be creating vast numbers of voters – and officeholders 
as well – who are mentally armed against science, against logical argument, and 
against the very elements of rational thought.
It is called “harmonization”, and springs from the need to protect the idea of 
biblical inerrancy; the belief that every word in the Bible is literally true. There are 
numerous inconsistencies in scripture, and instances of clear contradiction as well. 
The technique at work is easy to overlook or to dismiss, but a cultural anthropologist, 
Susan Friend Harding, examined it in a remarkable study, The Book of Jerry Falwell: 
Fundamentalist Language and Politics [Harding 2000]. She describes the process 
at length. As I put it in a review, “to the outsider, the most startling and ominous of 
Harding’s findings is the manner in which – in a defiance of reason – contradiction 
actually strengthens faith. The Bible is literally true in every respect. Identifying 
inconsistencies simply tests faith and (postmodernists take note) forces an accept-
ance of the inconsistent whole”. Believers are forced to harmonize “contradictions 
and infelicities according to interpretive conventions that presume, and thus reveal, 
God’s design”. In this sense, adherents of biblical literalism are “largely – if not 
completely – shielded against any challenge to their belief; shielded against inroads 
from the very bases of modern thought: logic and reason” [Skidmore, “Review” 2002]
Many Bible colleges that train fundamentalist ministers have specific courses in 
“harmonization”, courses that deal with biblical inconsistencies and contradictions. 
The courses indoctrinate until students can accept impossible propositions as true, 
eliminating awareness that if one thing is true, the other cannot be. This does not 
mean that fundamentalists are unaware of biblical inconsistencies – they tend to be 
too well versed in scripture to argue that. Vincent Crapanzano, also an anthropologist, 
immersed himself in the world of fundamentalism, as did Harding. He says that most 
of the fundamentalists he interviewed are not bothered by biblical inconsistencies, 
and often ignore them. “There simply was one meaning, God’s meaning – the plain, 
ordinary meaning, and one intention, God’s intention, that was manifested through 
the divinely inspired authors of Scripture”. Fundamentalists, he argues, “adhere to 
what is popularly called a ‘domino approach’ to the Bible. For them to admit even 
one error in Scripture would be to destroy their faith in the whole”. This, he says, 
illustrates the “all-or-nothing” quality of fundamentalism [Crapanzano 2000: 60–63]. 
When asked about biblical contradictions, many he interviewed dismissed them by 
saying such things “only appear as contradictions because we cannot understand 
God’s words fully” [Crapanzano 2000: 79].
The argument here is not to attack the doctrine of biblical inerrancy, or any the-
ological principle, nor to judge what is appropriate for a religion; it is absolutely to 
say that such thought is dangerous outside the theological realm. If large numbers of 
people are trained to dismiss logical contradiction within their religion as though it 
is unimportant, they may think similarly when dealing with economics, politics, or 
other phenomena in the secular world. This is especially true in the United States, 
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in which the power of fundamentalists has become a major force in one of its two 
major political parties. 
Is it unreasonable to think that dismissal of evolution in religion, for example, 
may be related to rejection of scientific arguments outside of churches? Brendan 
Nyhan, who teaches government at Dartmouth College, recently published an op-ed 
piece in “The New York Times” that may be relevant here. He pointed to a study 
by Yale Law School professor, Dan Kahan, demonstrating that those who dismiss 
evolution and human-influenced climate change may be well informed, “they knew 
the science; they just weren’t willing to say that they believed in it”. In other words, 
if scientific consensus “contradicts their political or religious views,” they refuse to 
let that consensus affect their opinion. Nyhan says that his own research and that of 
his colleagues supports Kahan’s findings, and that “factual and scientific evidence 
is often ineffective at reducing misperceptions and can even backfire on issues like 
weapons of mass destruction, health care reform and vaccines. With science, as with 
politics, identity often trumps the facts” [Nyhan 2014: 3]. 
The next day, economist Paul Krugman in his own column cited Nyhan’s essay 
and demonstrated that the same phenomenon affects many of even the most distin-
guished professional economists – especially with regard to monetary matters. Issues 
that should be strictly factual and based entirely on evidence, instead were overridden 
by “faith”. The problem was not ignorance, it was wishful thinking, he concluded. 
The late economic disaster was caused by a housing bubble, but mainstream econ-
omists (while initially shocked at the developments) “quickly rallied”. Somehow, 
they concluded that the financial crisis had been the “fault of liberals”. The great 
danger then facing the economy came, not from the crisis itself, “but from the efforts 
of policy makers to limit the damage”. Both economists and politicians such as Paul 
Ryan began to issue “dire warnings”, about “printing money”, warning “currency 
debasement and inflation” would ensue. That this has not happened, nor appears at 
all likely, in no way has affected their arguments. Krugman noted that it is hardly 
the first time that “a politically appealing economic doctrine has been proved wrong 
by events”, but that most of the analysts have followed the same flawed approach of 
climate-change deniers. They “have gone down the conspiracy-theory rabbit hole,” 
and claim that, despite the evidence, “we really do have soaring inflation, but the 
government is lying about the numbers”. 
He asked why monetary theory is being treated like evolution or climate-change, 
rather than simply responding to the numbers, and concludes that “money is indeed 
a kind of theological issue”. Precisely in line with the argument of this article, 
Krugman says that “when faith – including faith-based economics – meets evidence, 
evidence doesn’t have a chance” [Krugman 2014: A17].
Crapanzano does not allege that literalism in the law is rooted in American evan-
gelicalism. He does not look to their religion to discern the roots of the interpretations 
of the legal literalists. “My aim is to delineate a mode of interpretation, whatever its 
source”, he says [Crapanzano 2000: xviii]. 
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This, I agree, is what is important. Nevertheless, I argue that it would be unwise 
not to recognize the potential effect of fundamentalist thought – and literalist thought 
in general – on policy. Because of America’s overwhelming world influence, for 
example, fundamentalist thought on American policy is almost always pernicious. 
In years past the US has banned “needle-exchange programs (thus contributing to 
the spread of AIDS), and family-planning programs, (thus contributing to pover-
ty, starvation, and the subjugation of women)” [Skidmore, “Review” 2002: 89]. 
Moreover, religious extremism has effects even beyond US policy. Uganda’s 2014 
Anti-Homosexuality Law provides life sentences for homosexuals. Uganda had 
laws against homosexuality as legacies of British colonialism, but the impetus for 
the recent cruelty came from American evangelists, active in Uganda conducting 
seminars, speaking publically, and working closely with government officials there. 
EDUCATION FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT
Populism, itself, is not where the danger lies; it lies in insufficient preparation 
of the populace to meet the demands of self-government. However utopian it may 
now seem, an education for democracy is a possibility. It will never be perfect, and 
nothing can ensure that public choices will always be wise ones, but it would seem 
that societies can achieve a workable balance between critical awareness, on the 
one hand, and an acceptance of sufficient civic cohesion to encourage a functioning 
society, on the other; not easy, but possible.
One of the more prescient social critics and advocates of an education for democra-
cy was the prominent literary figure from the middle twentieth century, Aldous Huxley. 
He observed totalitarian states, and examined tendencies elsewhere, going beyond 
literary satire to offer alternatives. He recognized that the mid-century evils were not 
confined to the obvious examples such as Nazi Germany and the Stalinist USSR.
In 1958, he published an extended essay, Brave New World Revisited, evaluating 
changes since his 1932 Brave New World. Many of the evils he warned would come 
in 500 years were already in place. 
Unfortunately, his fiction received more attention than did his prescriptions. 
Perhaps his influence was brought to a halt by the timing of his death which ensured 
that it would receive no attention whatever: he died on 22 November 1963, the day 
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Despite the lack of attention it has 
received, time has not lessened the force of Huxley’s thought [Huxley 2004].
“An ethical system that is based upon a fairly realistic appraisal of the data of 
experience”, Huxley wrote, “is likely to do more good than harm”. Sadly, though, 
many systems have been based on a view of the nature of things “that is hopelessly 
unrealistic”, and certainly an ethic of this sort “is likely to do more harm than good”. 
Until rather recently, he said, bad weather and numerous misfortunes were assumed 
to be the result of malevolent magicians – it was a duty to search them out. That 
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duty was “divinely ordained in the second Book of Moses: ‘Thou shalt not suffer 
a witch to live’. The systems of ethics and law that were based upon this erroneous 
view of the nature of things were the cause (during the centuries when they were 
taken most seriously by men in authority) of the most appalling evil”. Such an “orgy 
of spying lynching and judicial murder”, based on the erroneous view of magic, he 
said, had not since been duplicated until the time of the Nazis and Stalinists, “when 
the Communist ethic, based on erroneous views about economics, and the Nazi ethic, 
based upon erroneous views about race commanded and justified atrocities on an 
even greater scale”.
Even in western democracies, he argued, governments and business had, or soon 
would have, the abilities of what he called “mind-manipulation” that he had portrayed 
in Brave New World. Unless prevented, societies will make use of all the techniques 
available. “If this kind of tyranny is to be avoided”, he said, “we must begin with-
out delay to educate ourselves and our children for freedom and self-government” 
[Huxley 2004: 325–327]. Within three years, President Eisenhower in his Farewell 
Address on 17 January 1961 gave a similar warning against the power and actions 
of the “military, industrial, complex”:
“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms in-
dustry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, 
even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal 
government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must 
not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are 
all involved; so is the very structure of our society. 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwar-
ranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. 
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or 
democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowl-
edgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military 
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and 
liberty may prosper together” [Eisenhower 1961]. 
As Huxley envisioned it, an education for freedom, for self-government, should 
be an education “first of all in facts and values – the fact of individual diversity and 
genetic uniqueness and the value of freedom, tolerance and mutual charity which 
are the ethical corollaries of these facts”. Most important: “correct knowledge and 
sound principles are not enough. An unexciting truth may be eclipsed by a thrilling 
falsehood. A skillful appeal to passion is often too strong for the best of good res-
olutions”. He anticipated Drew Westin’s findings mentioned above, and also was 
correct that counteracting “false and pernicious propaganda” is a huge task. The 
only way to neutralize it, he said, is “by a thorough training in the art of analyzing 
its techniques and seeing through its sophistries. Language,” he said, has made it 
possible for humanity to achieve civilization, but “language has also inspired that 
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sustained folly and that systematic, that genuinely diabolic wickedness which are 
no less characteristic of human behavior than are the language-inspired virtues”, 
including sustained forethought and benevolence [Huxley 2004: 327–328].
There may be time still to heed his powerful admonition. “In their anti-rational 
propaganda” he said, “the enemies of freedom systematically pervert the resources 
of language in order to wheedle or stampede their victims into thinking, feeling and 
acting as they, the mind-manipulators, want them to think, feel and act. An education 
for freedom (and for the love and intelligence which are at once the conditions and 
the results of freedom) must be, among other things an education in the proper uses 
of language”. All the information for such an education is now available, he says, 
noting that philosophers have long studied meaning, have analyzed symbols, and 
have developed the intellectual materials required for “an education in the art of 
distinguishing between the proper and improper use of symbols” at every level from 
kindergarten to the doctorate. “Yet”, he complains, “children are nowhere taught, in 
any systematic way, to distinguish true from false, or meaningful from meaningless 
statements”. Answering his own question, “why is this so?” he says that even in dem-
ocratic countries their elders “do not want them to be given this kind of education”.
This led him to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. “With all the Allied gov-
ernments engaging in ‘psychological warfare’, an insistence upon the desirability 
of analyzing propaganda”, he said wryly, “seemed a bit tactless”. Even before IPA 
closed, he said, there were many who found its activities to be “profoundly objec-
tionable”. Certain educators feared that propaganda analysis would make adolescents 
“unduly cynical”. Military authorities condemned it, and were fearful that it could 
lead recruits to “analyze the utterances of drill sergeants”. Then came advertisers 
and the clergy. Advertisers objected because they feared that propaganda analysis 
might “undermine brand loyalty and reduce sales”, while from the clergy came the 
charge that propaganda analysis might “undermine belief and diminish churchgoing” 
[Huxley 2004: 329–330].
All these concerns, he said, were well-founded. “Too searching a scrutiny by too 
many of the common folk of what is said by their pastors and masters might prove to 
be profoundly subversive”. He saw the problem as one of balance between tradition 
and civic cohesion, on the one hand, and rational analysis, on the other. He believed 
a middle ground between gullibility on the one extreme and being “helplessly un-
der the spell of professional mind-manipulators”, on the other, would be possible. 
Education should arm the public against “an uncritical belief in sheer nonsense”, 
without making the people reject every well-meant utterance that is not explicitly 
rational. There may be times when symbolism and tradition have their own values 
apart from the strictly rational. 
He concedes that analysis alone is not the answer, implicitly recognizing that 
a completely intellectual approach, analysis without regard for feeling, emotion, and 
for relevant but non-rational factors is not enough. There must also be a positive 
approach, “the enunciation of a set of generally acceptable values based upon a solid 
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foundation of facts. The value, first of all, of individual freedom, based upon the facts 
of human diversity and genetic uniqueness; the value of charity and compassion, 
based upon the old familiar fact that, whatever their mental and physical diversity, 
love is as necessary to human beings as food and shelter; and finally, the value of 
intelligence, without which love is impotent and freedom unattainable”. This, he 
asserted, is the “set of values” that will provide the “criterion by which propaganda 
may be judged” [Huxley 2004: 330–331]. 
CONCLUSIONS
The title Populism and its perils, is accurate only in that populist appeals may 
lead both to beneficial or detrimental action. The peril is less from populism, as 
such, than from those who would use public appeals for something other than for 
the public good. We need not fear “populism”, only to recognize and guard against 
irrationality, misuse of language, and appeals that would do harm whether or not 
they are well-intentioned.
Nyhan suggests that we seek to disconnect “the association between identity and 
factual beliefs on high-profile issues”. One can believe in human-induced climate 
change and still be a conservative Republican, for instance, such as former US 
Representative Bob Inglis. Similarly one can be a climate scientist and still be an 
evangelical Christian such as Katherine Hayhoe.
Language is the key. It is vital that appeals be crafted carefully, with attention 
to clarity, and that they be crafted to appeal to the imagination as well as to the in-
tellect. It is equally essential that the audience be able to exercise skill in analyzing 
the language it hears, and that the public be able to recognize the extent to which 
“the public good” would be the true effect of whatever policies are being advocated. 
The public good must be judged on the basis of what is best for all, not merely the 
greatest number. 
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